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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal was perfected to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3) (j) and Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 3. It subsequently was transferred to the Utah 
Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the lower court 
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Lexington 
Insurance Company on the ground that it was not an insurer of 
M & C Management Corporation in connection with an injury suffered 
by appellant Harry Naylor. Appellant Harry Naylor maintains that 
triable questions of material fact respecting the existence of this 
insurer/insured relationship precluded the lower court from 
granting summary judgment. 
The standard of review is as follows. The party against whom 
summary judgment was granted (in this instance, the appellant, 
Harry Naylor) is entitled to have all facts and inferences from the 
same examined in a light most favorable to him, and the judgment 
should be affirmed only where no triable question of material fact 
is present. This Court reviews issues of law giving no deference 
to the views of the lower court. See, e.g.
 f English v. Kienke, 774 
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993); 
Hunt v. ESI Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant/intervenor Harry Naylor submits this statement of 
the case, including a description of the nature of the case, the 
course of proceedings, the disposition in the lower court, and the 
relevant facts. For convenience in reference, the appellant Harry 
Naylor shall be called "Naylor," the appellee Lexington Insurance 
Company shall be called "Lexington," and M & C Management 
Corporation shall be called "M & C." 
Nature of the Case 
This was an action for declaratory judgment to determine 
whether Lexington was the insurer under a policy of liability 
insurance of M & C in connection with an injury suffered by Naylor. 
Course of Proceedings 
Lexington filed a complaint and then an amended complaint 
under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Statute, naming M & C as the 
defendant, and seeking a determination that Lexington had no 
insurer/insured relationship with M & C. The amended complaint is 
found at R. 38-74. Naylor sought leave to intervene, on the 
grounds that M & C essentially was defunct and unable to defend, 
and that Naylor was the only party in interest with incentive and 
means to action by Lexington. R. 85-88. The motion for leave to 
intervene was granted. R. 107-108. Lexington then moved for 
summary judgment, arguing numerous grounds, such as the absence of 
an insurer/insured relationship with M & C, failure by M & C to 
comply with the covenant of cooperation in the insurance contract, 
failure of M & C to give the required notice under the insurance 
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contract, and so forth. R. 137-233. This motion was granted on 
the question of the insurer/insured relationship, but on no other 
basis. Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on December 6, 1993, 
before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, pages 39-40, at R. 491-492. 
Final judgment was entered January 20, 1994. R. 440-444. Naylor 
timely brought this appeal. R. 445-447. 
Disposition in Lower Court 
As described above, Lexington's motion for summary judgment 
was granted on the issue of the insurer/insured relationship. 
Relevant Facts 
The relevant facts are presented below in roughly 
chronological order. While reviewing these facts, the Court should 
bear in mind that the instant action for declaratory relief from 
which this appeal arises is one of three related lawsuits, 
described below. 
1. In February, 1990, Naylor filed suit for personal injury 
against three entities, Coordinated Spa Services, Inc. ("CSS"), 
Fitness America, Inc. ("Fitness") , and M & C. This suit was 
commenced in the Third Judicial District Court for the State of 
Utah, and because it is pending before the Honorable John A. Rokich 
of that Court, it sometimes will be referenced in this brief as 
"the Rokich litigation." Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 
1 and Exhibit A, at R. 297-298 and 304-309. 
2. In March, 1990, the complaint in the Rokich litigation was 
answered for CSS by an attorney, Thomas J. Klc ("Klc"). CSS and 
Klc are insurance adjusters, licensed as such in the State of Utah. 
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There is evidence, as indicated below, that they were acting in the 
capacity of adjustors on behalf of Lexington in connection with the 
injury to Naylor and the litigation between Naylor, Fitness, and 
M & C, or in other words, the Rokich litigation. In the answer for 
CSS, Klc represented that Fitness and M & C were legally defunct 
and devoid of assets, including presumably insurance, and that in 
light of these facts, any defense to the complaint probably would 
be pointless. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 2 and 
Exhibit B, at R. 298 and 310-311. 
3. Consistent with this answer to the complaint in the Rokich 
litigation, CSS and Klc represented to the attorney for Naylor, 
Kathleen McConkie ("McConkie"), that there was no insurance for 
Fitness or M & C which would cover the injury suffered by Naylor. 
Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 3, at R. 298. 
4. McConkie, however, persisted in this line of inquiry, using 
discovery to test the representation of CSS and Klc concerning the 
lack of insurance for Fitness or M & C. CSS and Klc finally 
acknowledged, in response to discovery requests, that at a certain 
point in time they had a contractual duty to procure insurance for 
Fitness and M & C, and that in satisfaction of this duty, they had 
obtained a policy of insurance from Lexington. Affidavit of 
Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 4 and Exhibit C, at R. 298-299 and 
312-335. 
5. After considerable delay, CSS and Klc produced a copy of 
the Lexington policy. The copy produced, however, did not contain 
an endorsement naming M & C as an insured, even though, as noted 
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above, the answers to discovery indicated that the insurance was 
procured for M & C. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 5, 
at R. 299. 
6. CSS and Klc then gave McConkie permission to work directly 
with Lexington in resolving the question of insurance for M & C and 
recompense in that regard for the injury suffered by Naylor. 
Pursuant to this permission, in October, 1990, McConkie called the 
office of Lexington in Massachusetts. Speaking with an employee 
at Lexington during this call, McConkie learned that CSS and Klc 
had adjusted claims in times past for Lexington. Indeed, the 
employee exuded that CSS and Klc had adjusted many claims to the 
satisfaction of Lexington. Thereafter, McConkie wrote to 
Lexington, asking for settlement of the claim of Naylor against 
Fitness and M & C. This correspondence was accompanied by a large 
packet of claim information, including a profile of Naylor, 
description of the accident, medical records, and the like. 
Pleadings from the Rokich litigation between Naylor, Fitness, and 
M & C also were attached. These pleadings included the admissions 
of CSS, via Klc, that insurance had been procured for Fitness and 
M & C through Lexington. The Lexington policy in this regard (as 
produced by CSS and Klc) was attached as an exhibit to the 
correspondence. McConkie invited a settlement from Lexington, but 
warned that she was prepared to default the defendants in the 
Rokich litigation. The threat of default, in any event, was 
implicit in the demand, since the litigation, after all, had been 
pending since February, 1990. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, 
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paragraph 6 and Exhibit D, at R. 299 and 336-342, 
7. On January 8, 1991, Lexington responded to McConkie by 
letter from an employee, Michael Knox ("Knox"). The Knox letter 
referenced the "insured" under the policy in question as "Star 
Health and Fitness." The text of the letter mentioned, as 
"insured," both Fitness and M & C, and disclaimed, as "insured," 
only CSS. The text of the letter also noted the discovery 
responses from CSS and Klc in the Rokich litigation which had been 
attached to the correspondence from McConkie. Lexington, however, 
denied coverage to any "insured" (whether Star Health, Fitness, or 
M & C) on the basis of a so-called Self-Insured Retention Clause 
(or "SIR") in the insurance policy, rather than on the basis, later 
asserted in the instant suit, that there was no insurer/insured 
relationship any of the named entities, such as M & C. Affidavit 
of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 7 and Exhibit E, at R. 299-300 and 
343-346. 
8. In early 1991, following this denial of coverage by 
Lexington, Naylor took judgment by default against Fitness in the 
Rokich litigation. Then in the spring of 1991, as judgment 
creditor of Fitness, Naylor sued Lexington in federal district 
court (before the Honorable David Sam) to collect under the 
contract of insurance. Lexington answered this suit, denying 
coverage under the liability policy on various grounds, including 
the contention that Fitness was not an "insured" with Lexington. 
In this regard, Knox submitted an affidavit in the federal district 
court action, explaining that, in his letter to McConkie, dated 
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January 8, 1991 and noted above, Knox did not mean to imply that 
Fitness was an insured under the liability policy, Knox testified 
in this affidavit that the only insureds under that policy were the 
four entities named on the "Cover Note" and on the "Declarations 
Page" of the policy. Fitness and M & C are not listed in either 
of these places. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 8 and 
Exhibit F, at R. 300 and 347-351. 
9. While the federal district court litigation was pending, 
and in an effort to persuade McConkie that coverage under the 
contract of insurance was not available for the injury of Naylor 
in any event, Lexington revealed a new copy of the liability 
policy, different from the copy which earlier had been produced in 
discovery in the Rokich litigation by CSS and Klc. Lexington 
invited McConkie to meet and confer respecting the implications of 
this new copy of the insurance policy. This new copy of the 
insurance policy did not include an endorsement of M & C as an 
insured. McConkie, however, discovered that this new copy of the 
insurance policy was bowdlerized. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, 
paragraph 9, at R. 300-301. 
10. In July, 1991, McConkie discovered an M & C endorsement 
to the Lexington policy in the files of the Poulton Insurance 
Agency. She also learned that, at the time Naylor was injured, in 
April, 1986, M & C was paying the premiums for this insurance to 
Lexington. Also in July, 1991, Naylor took default judgment 
against M & C in the Rokich litigation. Affidavit of Kathleen 
McConkie, paragraph 10 and Exhibit G, at R. 301 and 352-368. 
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11. In August, 1991, Lexington filed a motion for intervention 
in the Rokich litigation. This request for intervention allegedly 
was for the purpose of moving, under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to vacate the judgment against M & C.1 The Rule 
60(b) pleadings of Lexington implied that the judgment should be 
overturned because M & C was defunct and bankrupt, and therefore 
helpless and defenseless, and that due to a want of notice, 
Lexington was disabled earlier from supplying this defense. 
(Lexington asked for intervention in the suit, however, for itself, 
and not on behalf of M & C, as Lexington still was denying coverage 
under the policy.) in this batch of pleadings, Lexington also 
acknowledged that the policy of insurance in question covered the 
property of M & C, but denied that this policy covered the injury 
of Naylor. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 11 and 
Exhibit H, at R. 301-302 and 369-370. 
12. In the fall of 1991, Lexington filed the complaint in this 
action, seeking declaratory judgment against M & C respecting 
coverage issues under the insurance policy. Naylor intervened in 
this action, and summary judgment ultimately was granted on the 
insurer/insured issue in favor of Lexington, all as noted above. 
Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 12, at R. 302. 
This was the second motion for intervention and relief 
brought by Lexington in the Rokich litigation. In the spring of 
1991, shortly after Naylor had filed suit against Lexington in 
federal district court, Lexington had entered the Rokich 
litigation, invoking Rule 24 and Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in connection with the judgment against Fitness. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
M & C was an insured under the policy of insurance with 
Lexington. The determination whether M & C was an insured under 
the policy of insurance with Lexington is a question of 
interpretation of the contract of insurance which turns upon the 
intent of the parties. Where ambiguities in this regard may be 
present, the policy should be construed against the drafter, 
Lexington, and in favor of a finding of coverage for M & C and the 
injured party, Naylor. There is at least a dispute concerning the 
intent of the parties to include M & C as an insured under the 
policy with Lexington, and triable issues of material facts on this 
point preclude the granting of summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
The Lower Court Erred in Granting 
Summary Judgment Because There Were 
Triable Issues of Material Fact 
Whether M & C Was 
An Insured of Lexington 
The question whether M & C is an "insured" under the policy 
with Lexington turns upon the intent of the parties, as that intent 
may be deciphered from the language of the contract of insurance, 
any endorsements to the same, and other facts and circumstances. 
If there is ambiguity in the language of the policy which bears 
upon the designation of the "insured," this language is construed 
strictly against the insurance company, in this instance, 
Lexington, and in favor of the beneficiary under the policy, M & 
14 
C, and the injured party, Naylor. 
The law, as a general rule, imposes "no requirement that a 
person must be described by name in order to be an insured under 
the policy. It has been held sufficient that his identity as an 
insured can be ascertained by applying the description contained 
in the policy." 4 J. Appleman, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, section 
2341, at 328 (rev. ed. 1968). 
Likewise, "[t]he insured may be identified in a policy either 
by name or by description. As the purpose of a name is to 
E.g.. Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1046-1047 
and n. 1 (Utah 1985) (ambiguities construed against insurer, and 
"[a]n insured is entitled to the broadest protection he could have 
reasonably understood to be provided by the policy"); Utah Farm 
Bureau v. Orville Andrews & Son, 665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983) 
("where the policy is ambiguous, doubt is resolved in favor of 
coverage ... [s]ince a policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities 
are construed against the insurer"); Bergera v. Ideal National Life 
Insurance Company. 524 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1974) (intent of parties 
is key to interpretation, ambiguities construed against insurer); 
Whitlock v. Old American Insurance Company, 442 P.2d 26, 28 (Utah 
1968) (intent of parties governs; rule of strictissimi juris; this 
rule "has been applied almost universally to insurance contracts, 
giving a liberal construction in favor of the insured toward the 
coverage which the insured reasonably could assume he is buying and 
for which he pays his premiums ... [in light of this rule, the 
court has held] that the insured is entitled to the broadest 
coverage he could reasonably understand from the policy"); Dienes 
v. Safeco Life Insurance Company, 442 P.2d 468, 470-471 (Utah 1968) 
(extended explanation giving historical grounds and practical 
reasons for construing policy in favor of insured; "no ambiguous 
statement is to be enforced against an insured"); P. E. Ashton 
Company v. Joyner, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965) (rule of 
construction in favor of coverage should be applied not only in 
case of ambiguity, but also where there may be doubt or 
uncertainty); Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (rules of construction which are applied to 
insurance policy are applicable to applications for insurance as 
well); Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (good general discussion of rules of construction for 
insurance policies). 
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designate the person intended to be insured, any designation which 
fulfills that purpose is sufficient. Moreover, when the intent to 
cover a particular risk is clear, the name of the insured is not 
always important," 2A G. Couch, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 
2d, section 23.4, at 772-774 (rev. ed. 1984). 
The cases support these principles, emphasizing that the 
designation of an "insured" is a matter of intent between the 
parties, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp.. 663 F.2d 
751, 759 (7th Cir. 1981), and that an "insured" may be added by 
endorsement to a policy, e.g., Unigard Ins. Co. v. Studer, 536 F.2d 
1337 (10th Cir. 1976).3 
In Utah, a party which is not identified by name in a policy 
nevertheless may be a "defacto [sic] coinsured." Fashion Place 
Investment, Ltd. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (contest over rights of subrogation). See also, Lazarus 
v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co., 267 F.2d 634 (D. C. Cir. 
1959) ("[t]he primary intent, we think, was to insure a particular 
business, and not a particular person[;]" policy written for 
individual using trade name, but coverage extended to partners 
where the business was a partnership, even though the partnership 
may have been dissolved or terminated); Providence Washington 
Insurance Company v. Stanley, 403 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1968), on 
petition for rehearing, 406 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1969) (the identity 
of the insured was for the jury to determine; dispute whether 
insured was corporation or owners of corporation; also trade name 
confusion); New York Underwriters Insurance Company v. Union 
Construction Company, 432 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1970) (agent having 
knowledge of the business and intentions of the parties selected 
the designation of insured for the policy; insurer estopped from 
disputing this intent in contest over coverage); Pacific Insurance 
Co. of New York v. Christ ianson. 111 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1961) 
(individual operator of a shoe repair shop — who is paying 
premiums — is insured even though policy is in name of "Kramer 
Shoe Repair Shop," and even though he has inherited operations from 
retired owner, his father); Brugioni v. Maryland Casualty Company, 
382 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. Sup. Ct., Div. No. 2, 1964) (robbery victim 
entitled to insurance coverage under bank policy, because he comes 
within losses provision, even though not listed as named insured); 
Heffler v. Tariff, 57 N.Y.S.2d 583 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. , App. Div., 
16 
Applying this law, the facts bearing upon M & C as an insured 
are at least sufficiently in conflict to defeat a motion under Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if they do not preclude 
altogether the argument of Lexington. For a sampling, please 
consider. 
1. There is an endorsement to the policy, specifically 
naming M & C, and describing the location of the business 
to be insured — the same location as the business of M 
& C, and where Naylor suffered injury. R. at 301 and 
352-368. 
2. The endorsement naming M & C is consistent with the 
pattern, reflected in the policy, of naming through 
endorsement various entities and business locations 
intended for coverage. One page alone designates 55 
different corporations with addresses across the eastern 
seaboard. R. at 301 and 352-368. 
3. Lexington apparently does not consider the named 
insured (in item one on the declarations page) as the 
only insured under the policy. The affidavit of Knox, 
submitted in the federal district court action, states 
that "21st Century Spas, Ltd.," "Holiday Health, Inc.," 
and "Spa Lady, Inc." are insureds, even though they are 
listed on the "cover note," instead of on item one of the 
declarations page along with "Spa Health and Fitness 
Centers" (which is not listed on the "cover note"). R. 
at 300 and 347-351. Moreover, the letter written by Knox 
to McConkie, dated January 8, 1991, hints that "Star 
Health and Fitness," an entity nowhere listed on the 
declarations page or cover note, also may be an insured. 
R. at 299-300 and 343-346. 
Third Dept., 1945) (named insured was individual partner, while 
injured party claimed coverage because of relation with co-
partnership; where the policy "expressly covered the place of 
injury," then the "'name of the insured in the policy is not always 
important if the intent to cover the risk is clear1" [citation 
omitted]); North American Ace. Ins. Co. v. Canady, 163 P.2d 221 
(Okla. 1945) (use of adopted or trade name, rather than real name; 
Ml[i]t is said that in view of the common-law principle that the 
office and purpose of a name is only that of identification, if it 
is clear that an insurance company is not misled as to the identity 
of the applicant, there seems to be no reason why it should be 
allowed to avoid the risk on such an account1" [citation omitted]). 
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4. The letter of Knox to McConkie, dated January 8, 1991, 
speaking on behalf of Lexington, calls M & C an 
"insured." R. at 299-300 and 343-346. This admission 
is cogent evidence that M & C is an insured, given the 
context of this correspondence. McConkie had written to 
Knox, inquiring about a settlement from Lexington on 
account of the three defendants in the Rokich litigation. 
Her information packet, which" accompanied the letter, 
among other things, contained discovery pleadings wherein 
CSS and Klc admit the procurement of insurance (the 
Lexington policy) for M & C. McConkie is threatening a 
judgment by default. R. at 299 and 3 3 6-342. Knox 
answers McConkie, under threat, and refers to M & C as 
an "insured." In the same paragraph of this letter, Knox 
denies that CSS is a Lexington insured. R. at 299-3 00 
and 343-346. In testimony by affidavit in the federal 
district court action, before Judge Sam, Knox back-
pedalled from these admissions, stating that his 
reference to M & C as an "insured" was based upon the 
allegations of McConkie in her letter to him, and upon 
his "assumption" that these allegations were correct. 
R. at 300 and 347-351. This seems an improbable 
"assumption" for a claims adjuster, especially one who 
is being threatened with default judgment, and who is 
addressing a coverage issue in correspondence to an 
adversary. It seems even more unlikely given the care 
taken by Knox, in his letter, to distinguish between the 
three defendants, owning Fitness and M & C as insureds, 
but disowning CSS as such. Nevertheless, under Rule 56, 
the lower court should not have resolved these issues of 
fact. On the contrary, the lower court should have 
allowed every possible factual inference in favor of 
Naylor on thes motion, and that includes the inference, 
noted above, that Lexington's own representative admitted 
that M & C was insured under the policy. 
Additional circumstances belie the subsequent abjuration of 
Knox as an employee of Lexington. By the time he replied to 
McConkie, Knox should have made a reasonable investigation of the 
Naylor claim — including the identity of the insureds under the 
policy. At a minimum, Knox was calling M & C an "insured" after 
the time allowed for a reasonable investigation. The Utah 
Insurance Commissioner has promulgated an "Unfair Claims Settlement 
Procedures Rule" which "affirmatively establish[es] standards of 
equity and good faith to guide licensees in the settlement of 
claims." These standards are "minimum standards." Among other 
requirements, they impose upon insurers a 45 day limit for the 
"complete investigation of a claim," once notice has been given of 
the claim to the insurer. If a longer period is needed, the 
insurer has the burden, "by adequate records," of showing this. 
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5. As noted above, CSS and Kic admitted, pursuant to 
discovery requests in the Rokich litigation, that they 
obtained insurance for M & C, and the only policy which 
they have identified in this regard is the Lexington 
policy. R. at 298-299 and 312-335. 
6. M & C paid the premiums for the insurance in question. 
R. at 301 and 352-368. 
7. On pages 1-2 of a "Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Lexington Insurance Company's 
Motion to Intervene" in the action before Judge Rokich, 
Lexington states: "While it appears that the property 
in question [the M & C property] was in fact insured by 
Lexington when plaintiff's cause of action arose, it is 
also quite clear that the policy issued by Lexington 
simply does not cover the injuries alleged by plaintiff." 
R. at 301-302 and 369-370. Although this admission may 
be half-hearted, it implies at least property coverage. 
And this coverage seems clear from the endorsement to the 
policy which lists M & C and gives the address for the 
spa in Bountiful. R. at 301 and 352-368. Moreover, 
neither the endorsement nor the policy anywhere 
bifurcates coverage for M & C along the lines drawn in 
the above quotation. And the forms submitted by the 
Poulsen agency in connection with the application for M 
& C suggest that coverage was intended for liability as 
And denying a claim, without conducting a reasonable investigation, 
is defined expressly as an unfair and deceptive act and practice. 
3 Utah Administrative Code, R590-89-2, R590-89-3, R590-89-11, and 
R590-89-7E (1993). 
Hence, whether Lexington's notice of the Naylor claim is 
measured from March, 1990, when the complaint in the Rokich 
litigation was served upon CSS and Klc as agents for Lexington, or 
whether it is measured from October, 1990, when after receiving 
permission from CSS and Klc, McConkie wrote directly to Lexington, 
the 45 day limit under the Utah Insurance Commissioner's 
regulations had expired or virtually expired when Knox responded 
to McConkie. (Notice is defined in the Commissioner's rules to 
include notice from a third party claimant or his legal 
representative, and may be to the insurer or to an agent of the 
insurer, R590-89-4.) 
Thus, unless Lexington was guilty of an unfair and deceptive 
act and practice, it had conducted a reasonable investigation when 
it denied the Naylor claim in the letter to McConkie. It is 
improbable that an adjustor for Lexington would have misstated the 
identity of the insured after a reasonable investigation. 
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well as property. R. at 301 and 352-368. 
The description of law, and the specification of facts, given 
above, show that Lexington should not have prevailed on the issue 
of the insurer/insured relationship with M & C on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Naylor believes that, given the standards under Rule 56, the 
motion for summary judgment of Lexington should not have been 
granted in the lower court. Triable issues of material fact on the 
issue of the intent of the parties under the contract of insurance 
respecting the status of M & C as an insured precluded summary 
judgment. The judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and 
the matter remanded for a trial on the merits. 
Dated this 3 °f v day of August, 1994. 
Kathleen McConkie or 
Alan L. Smith 
Attorneys for Naylor 
Crippen, McConkie & Cline 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-1508 
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The undersigned certifies that a copy of this "Opening Brief 
of Appellant/Intervenor" was served this 3ofo day of August, 1994, 
by mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed to the office of 
counsel for Lexington Insurance Company, Michael L. Schwab, 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor, 
50 South Main Street, P. 0. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-
2465. 
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